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Abstract
We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players’ payoffs result from coalitional bargain-
ing. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit
some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive
under mild conditions an explicit formula for each type’s equilibrium payoff as market frictions
vanish. The limit payoff of a type depends in an intuitive way on the supply and the demand for
this type in the market, adjusted by the type-speciﬁc bargaining power. Our framework may be
viewed as an alternative to the Walrasian price-setting mechanism. When we apply this method-
ology to the analysis of labor markets, we can determine endogenously the equilibrium ﬁrm size
and remuneration scheme. We ﬁnd that each worker type in a stationary market equilibrium is
rewarded her marginal product, i.e. we obtain a strategic underpinning of the neoclassical wage.
Interestingly, we can also replicate some standardized facts from the search-theoretical literature
such as positive equilibrium unemployment.
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In many economic situations, the surplus from trade depends on the actions and preferences of
multiple agents. This is certainly the case in inter-connected markets like supply chains, markets
where intermediaries play a prominent role, for example ﬁnancial or real estates markets, and labor
markets. One may argue that the standard two-sided markets models offer a good enough approx-
imation of the more complex environment in these multilateral examples; but do they? Questions
such as how prices are formed in multilateral markets; whether they are unique and anonymous;
how they are related to the benchmark competitive price resulting from a tˆ atonnement process are
the subject of this study.
Our aim in developing a framework for the study of multilateral markets is to capture a com-
petitive environment in which strategic behavior by players leads to the formation of prices. To
this end, we generalize Rubinstein and Wolinsky’s (1985) seminal model of a strategic buyer-seller
market to multilateral markets. We also follow these authors in employing the notion of stationary
market equilibrium for determining equilibrium prices. Like Gul (1989), Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray,
and Sengupta (1993), and more recently Yan (2005) we ﬁnd that employing stationarity strengthens
the predictive power of the equilibrium.1 In fact, we show the payoff uniqueness of the stationary
equilibria in all games in which players exhibit some degree of impatience (Theorem 1).
To analyze in greater detail the properties of equilibrium payoffs, we extend our analysis to
market games with heterogeneous types of players that may be treated as type-speciﬁc factors of
production. Here, we focus on the limit behavior of players, i.e. we study stationary equilibria
when players become patient. In this environment, we show that players of the same type receive
identical limit equilibrium payoffs, i.e. that prices are anonymous; and that these payoffs exhaust
the value of those coalitions which reach an agreement (Theorem 2, items (i) and (ii)). This result
implies the endogenous emergence of unique limit equilibrium price for each factor of production.
1The multiplicity of perfect equilibria in the extension of Rubinstein’s (1982) model to multilateral bargaining has
been ﬁrst pointed out by Shaked and reported by Sutton (1986).
2Furthermore, we establish that each factor of production in a limit market equilibrium is rewarded
(approximately) its marginal contribution to the coalition where agreement is reached (Theorem
2, item (iii)). As such, unlike Gul (1989) and Hart and Mas-Collel (1996), we ﬁnd that the limit
market equilibria of our market game are unrelated to the Shapley value of the corresponding
transferrable utility game.
Thelastofourgeneralresults, focusesonthelimitequilibriainwhichtheratioofthecoalitional
values to the coalitional limit equilibrium payoffs is different for any two coalitions with different
type proﬁles and which share at least one type of members. We name these equilibria separating.
We show that a separating limit market equilibrium induces a partition of player types according
to types of coalitions in which they reach an agreement and fully characterize players’ equilibrium
payoffs (Theorem 3).
The relation between the neoclassical price and the equilibrium payoff in the model becomes
clearer when we apply our bargaining methodology to the study of the labor market. Here the neo-
classical wage presents a natural benchmark for the remuneration schedule derived in equilibrium.
Somewhat surprisingly,2 we ﬁnd that in equilibrium when workers are patient, each worker’s share
of the ﬁrm’s value equals (approximately) her marginal contribution to the ﬁrm, i.e. her marginal
product of labor. In essence, we provide a strategic underpinning of the neoclassical competitive
wage.
This ﬁnding differs from those of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) and Okada (2011) and is similar
in spirit to that of Westermark (2003). A crucial difference between this work and that of Wester-
mark (2003), however, is that while we study multilateral bargaining, wages are determined by a
sequence of bilateral bargaining events in his model. In particular, we ﬁnd that the parity between
the neoclassical wage and limit payoffs in this model coexists with some standardized facts shown
in the search-theoretic literature3 such as a positive level of equilibrium unemployment even when
2Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985, 1990) ﬁnd that strategic bargaining may not lead to the competitive market outcome
when applying a similar bargaining methodology to the study of buyer-seller markets.
3For a recent survey of the search-theoretic literature see Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005).
3players are patient.4 In addition, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium, worker’s relative wage does not de-
pend on bargaining frictions, as embodied in the discount factor and the matching probabilities.
Instead, it depends in an intuitive way on the relative bargaining power between the entrepreneur
and the worker and it is an increasing function of the relative labor market tightness given by the
ratio of the number of vacancies and total labor supply. Importantly, our model allows for an en-
dogenousselectionofﬁrmsize(i.e., thecompositionofagreeingcoalitions). FortheCobb-Douglas
economy, our analysis shows further that the equilibrium ﬁrm size is positively related to the total
labor supply and it is negatively related to the concavity of the production function.
Withitsfocusondynamicmultilateralbargaining, thispapercontributestotwogrowingbranches
of literature: that on dynamic markets (for example, in the context of seller-buyer markets see Ru-
binstein and Wolinsky (1985), Binmore and Herrero (1988), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990), and,
more recently Dufﬁe, Gˆ aarleanu, and Pedersen (2005) and Manea (2011)); and that on coalitional
bargaining (e.g. Chatterjee et al. (1993), Hart and Mas-Collel (1996), Chatterjee and Sabourian
(2000), and more recently Okada (2011)). Based on its bargaining procedure, our work is closest
in nature to Manea (2011). In fact, our Theorem 1 can be seen as a generalization of Manea’s result
on the payoff-uniqueness when the matched bilateral coalitions are network links with normalized
values. We show that this uniqueness holds also in bargaining games on weighted networks and,
more generally, in games on hypergraphs that represent multilateral coalitions. Our work differs
from other studies on multilateral markets in the bargaining procedure and matching mechanism.
Several other works study multilateral bargaining, however, they do not consider a dynamic market.
Some of these focus on characteristic function form games. These authors either aim at supporting
core allocations as equilibrium outcomes (cf. Yan (2003)) or focus on the efﬁciency of the bargain-
ing outcomes (cf. Chatterjee et al. (1993) and Okada (1996)). In a related contribution, Krishna and
Serrano (1996) allow for “partial agreement” where the agreeing agents leave the bargaining pro-
4Neither Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) or Westermark (2003) ﬁnd a positive level of equilibrium unemployment in
their models. Okada (2011), on the other hand, ﬁnds a possibility for a positive unemployment only if players have some
degree of impatience.
4cedure with their agreed shares, while the proposer and the disagreeing agents proceed to the next
stage of bargaining. While the assumption of “partial agreement” may be valid in certain contexts,
e.g., division of an estate, it is less applicable to others such as production with complementary
inputs. Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000), instead, study unanimous agreement of all parties in the
multi-person ultimatum game. They, however, assume that bargaining continues until agreement
is reached. As our focus is on anonymous dynamic markets, the assumption that the bargaining
coalition dissolves in case of disagreement seems more plausible. Finally, Okada (2011) studies
coalitional bargaining in the context of coalition formation where a proposal is a pair of a coalition
of players and a payoff vector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe our theoretical frame-
work and in Section 3 we state our main existence result. In Section 4, we specialize our discussion
of market equilibria by introducing heterogeneous player types. In this context, we develop the no-
tions of limit market equilibrium and of separating limit market equilibrium and we discuss their
characterization. We employ the theoretical results to the study of the labor market with homoge-
neous and heterogeneous labor force in Section 5. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
2. Market Interaction
We consider a market with a ﬁnite set N of replica agents that operates over an inﬁnite number
of discrete dates. As any agent i 2 N that leaves the market is instantly replaced by its replica, the
set N remains in the market throughout the entire history of the game. We assume that all replicas
discount future dates with a common factor  2 (0;1).
Each date starts with a matching stage, in which a (possibly empty) coalition of players (subsets
of N) is randomly matched. Speciﬁcally, the probability S of selecting the coalition S  N is
implied by a stationary (exogenous) matching procedure and, hence, is constant throughout the
game. When matched, the members of S can produce a surplus v(S)  0 by employing their
player-speciﬁc inputs. The production of v(S) can only take place if all members of S agree on
the terms of trade. The latter are negotiated either according to the Nash Bargaining Solution
5(NBS) or one of the players is chosen as proposer in an ultimatum bargaining game.5 In the
latter case, proposer i 2 S makes sequentially (in any order) offers to the players in Snfig. Like
similar models that adopt the alternating offer mechanism of Rubinstein (1982), cf. Chatterjee
et al. (1993), we assume that the proposer is fully committed to the offers, once they are made. If
an offer is rejected, coalition S dissolves immediately, i.e., without any further offers being made,
and the same population of players proceeds to the next date. Otherwise, there is an agreement,
in which case the value v(S) is created, agents in Snfig receive their agreed shares and i obtains
the residual surplus. Then, the members of S leave the market and are replaced by their replicas
with the same endowments before the game moves to the next date. Importantly, all new agents
are treated by the matching procedure in the same way as the ones who left. In particular, the set
of newcomers that have replaced the members of an agreeing coalition S, will be selected with
probability S in all subsequent periods, in which it stays in the market.6
We parametrize the (absolute) bargaining power of player i 2 N by i, which is assumed to
be strictly positive and the same for all replicas of i. Let the set of all coalitions S  N containing
player i 2 N be denoted by Si. Then, the probability that player i is proposer in S 2 Si is given
by i=(S), where (S) :=
P
k2S k, for all i 2 S. In the context of Nash Bargaining, i=(S)
is the (relative) bargaining power of i in coalition S. In the next section, we explain how the
threat points (or minimum acceptance levels) are determined endogenously in a stationary market
equilibrium.
3. Stationary Equilibria
The market interaction described in the previous section deﬁnes a game with complete but im-
perfect information as we assume that players do not observe the terms of agreements they are not
5As all coalitional members need to agree for a proposal to be carried out, the proposer makes an offer of what Huang
(2002) refers to as conditional nature.
6Similar assumptions are made by Manea (2011) and Mortensen and Wright (2002) in the study of seller-buyer
markets. Alternatively, we can focus on steady states in which, by deﬁnition, this condition is also satisﬁed.
6part of.7 One way to analyze this game is to follow, e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) - RW
1985 hereafter - and deﬁne its extensive form. This deﬁnition speciﬁes histories and strategies for
all players. In particular, for any agent, the history at a certain stage of the game is the sequence
of observations made by her up to that stage. A strategy for any agent is, then, a sequence of de-
cision rules conditional on all histories that dictates player’s moves, i.e., the offers she makes as
a proposer and her acceptance/rejection responses to offers made to her. RW 1985 focus on sta-
tionary strategies, i.e., strategies that prescribe a history-independent bargaining behavior towards
the partners with whom an agent is matched. They deﬁne market equilibrium (ME thereafter) as a
stationary strategy proﬁle such that no agent can improve by changing her action after any possible
history.
In this work, we consider only MEa and, therefore, we omit the formalization of histories and
history-dependent strategies.8 At any date t, a stationary strategy of proposer i 2 S in a matched
coalition S will depend exclusively on the identities of responders in Snfig. Responder j 2 S,
on the other hand, will condition her stationary strategy on the coalition S, the identity of the
proposer i 2 S and on the offer made to her. It follows that for stationary strategy proﬁle, matching
environment and bargaining powers, each replica of player k 2 N expects the same payoff xk at
the beginning of any date. We exploit this fact to characterize MEa by deriving conditions for ME
payoffs fxkgk2N.
Speciﬁcally, if j 2 S is the last responder in the matched coalition S, she will accept in
equilibrium any offer larger than xj and rejects any offer smaller than xj. If the last but one
responder k 2 S anticipates the acceptance by j, she will accept any offer larger than xk and
rejects any offer smaller than xk. This argument propagates to all responders in S. Then, if
v(S)   x(Snfig) > xi , v(S) > x(S);
all responders in S accept in equilibrium their respective continuation payoffs with probability 1.
7This assumption is inoccuos for our results that focus on stationary equilibria.
8Such formalization would be a straightforward generalization of that in Manea (2011) to coalitions with more than
two members.
7Otherwise, proposer i 2 S, who obtains the residual surplus v(S)   x(Snfig) > xi, would be
betteroffbyincreasingoffersinﬁnitesimallytoensureallsequentialacceptances. Ifv(S) < x(S),
on the other hand, the residual claim is less than proposer’s continuation payoff xi and i will make
at least one unacceptable offer. This will lead to disagreement in S and respective continuation
payoffs for all members of S. Finally, if v(S) = x(S), players in S are indifferent between
agreement and disagreement, which can result in a randomized equilibrium agreements in S. This























maxfv(S)   x(S);0g; 8i 2 N: (1)
A solution x = (x
i)i2N to the system (1) yields the expected ME payoffs. A unique solution
x, in particular, yields a unique ME payoff proﬁle although this proﬁle can support multiple MEa.
Multiplicity occurs, for example, when responder j in the matched coalition S, for which holds
v(S) = x(S), agrees with any probability to the offer x
j.
We will say that S is active in ME x if S agrees in this equilibrium with positive probability.
Further, we will say that player i cooperates in ME x if i 2 S and S is active in x. The pattern
of cooperation among coalitions in a stationary equilibrium will be called coalitional cooperation
structure.
Note that re-writing (1) as,









(v(S)   x(S));xig; (2)
makes clear that the expected payoff xi results also when the outcome of each coalitional meet-
ing is prescribed by the NBS, where player i’s bargaining power is given by i=(S) and the
(endogenous) threat points are (xi)i2S.
We can interpret the payoff xi as the price that player i expects for her input in a ME. Note
that xi is different from player i’s expected agreement payoff. This distinction would have had
important implications, had the agents entered the market with a stock of inputs. If agents had
8traded repeatedly, the disagreement payoffs would have not internalized the utility loss due to
delayed cooperations. Although we allow each replica agent to trade only once, our model can be
easily extended in this direction.
The following Example 1 illustrates equilibrium payoffs in several stylized market settings.
Example 1. We consider a market with three players, N = f1;2;3g, who have equal bargaining
powers. Below we discuss several cases of value functions that capture various standard market
environments. To simplify our discussion and notation, in each case we only list the values of the
productive coalitions and take S = 0 for all unproductive coalitions S  N, i.e. v(S) = 0. In
addition, we will assume that all productive coalitions are matched with equal probabilities and
that the sum of these probabilities is one.
Bilateral Bargaining First, we consider a very simple buyer-seller market discussed by Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1990) where v(f1;2g) = 1. Then, the unique solution to system (1) yields the ME
payoff of 1=2 to each player in the coalition f1;2g and zero to the unproductive player 3. Clearly,
this market equilibrium is independent of the discount factor .
When we let v(f1;2g) = v(f1;3g) = 1, we obtain a standardized example of a buyer (player 1)
who bargains with two identical sellers (players 2 and 3) over the price of one unit of a homogenous











illustrates the fact that the single buyer cannot extract the entire surplus from the competing sellers
for any level of impatience (market frictions).
Generalizing the case above to a setting with two sellers of heterogenous goods, we set v(f1;2g) =













; if a  2;
x1
1 = a=2; x1
2 = 0; x1
3 = a=2; if a > 2:
9Thus, if players are patient, both buyer-seller pairs trade when a < 2, while only coalition f1;3g
agrees when a > 2. Note that all payoffs vary continuously in a.
Multilateral bargaining As in the benchmark bilateral example before, when only the three-player
coalition is productive, the outcome of the market game is to split the value of the coalition among
its members irrespective of the discount factor . For example, v(f1;2;3g) = 1 models trilateral
bargaining where the unique ME payoff yields 1=3 to each player.
Alternatively, multilateral bargaining may be captured by the case where v(S) = 1 for all S





; i = 1;2;3;
implies an agreement by any matched pair of players and a disagreement in the grand coalition.
It also shows that the ME payoffs can differ from the Shapley values of the corresponding static
game and that they are not in the core of this game, which is empty.
Finally, we consider a stylized example of intermediation. We let v(f1;2g) = v(f1;2;3g) = 1
be a market with one buyer (player 1), one seller (player 2) and an (unproductive) intermediary









2(12   12 + 2)
; (3)
illustrates, that the unique ME payoff to the buyer (seller) increases with , reaching 1=2 in the
limit  ! 1. The unique equilibrium payoff for the intermediary, on the other hand, is decreasing
with , reaching 0 when  ! 1. As expected, the intermediary’s proﬁt vanishes as the market
becomes frictionless.









2(2 ) = 1 and an agreement with any probability is rational in the grand coalition.
10We end this section by stating our fundamental result of existence and uniqueness.
Theorem 1. There exists a ME in any market game. All MEa yield a unique payoff proﬁle.
Proof: All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
4. Limit Market Equilibria and Multilateral Coalitions
In this section, we focus on a class of dynamic market games, where players of distinct
types interact. Speciﬁcally, we consider a partitioning of the set of agents N into T types, i.e.,
N = [t=1;:::;T Nt and Ns \ Nt = ? for all s;t = 1;:::;T with s 6= t. For all types t = 1;:::;t,
we denote the cardinality of the set Nt by Nt. A multilateral coalition (MC) S  N consists of
P
t=1;:::;T nt players, where nt = jS \ Ntj denotes the number of t-type players in this coalition.
For any MC S  N, we use the operator T(S) to obtain the type proﬁle of its members. For-
mally, given a MC S  N, its type T(S) is deﬁned as an ordered vector of type multiplicities, i.e.,
T(S) = (n1;:::;nT) where nt = jS \ Ntj for t = 1;:::;T. For example, for the grand coalition
we get T(N) = (N1;:::;NT) while for a singleton coalition fig with i 2 Nt, we obtain T(fig) =
et, where et is a vector in the canonical basis of the Euclidean space that points in direction t.
We assume that coalitions of the same type have the same productivity, i.e., v(S) = v(S0) when
T(S) = T(S0). Therefore, we can use the shorthand notation v(T(S)) for the productivity of any
coalition of type T(S). We assume further that all productive coalitions have a positive probability
of meeting, S > 0 if v(S) > 0. Finally, we require that players of the same type have equal
absolute bargaining powers, i = j if T(fig) = T(fjg).
Similar to Manea (2011) and Chatterjee et al. (1993), we study the market outcome when
participants are patient. Our aims are to characterize agreements in coalitions of different types
and derive explicit expressions for the players’ limit equilibrium payoffs. Formally, a limit market
equilibrium is deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 1. A ME x1, where x1 := lim!1 x and x is a solution to (1) will be called a limit
ME (LME).
11Note that LME is well-deﬁned as the solution x is unique by Theorem 1. The following result
establishes payoff-equivalence between players of the same type, the value exhaustion, and the
bounds on the LME payoffs.
Theorem 2. Consider a market game and a LME x1 of this game. Then
(i) all players of type t = 1;:::;T, receive the same payoff x1
t;




(iii) a player of type t that cooperates in a LME in coalitions of type n receives (approximately)
her marginal contribution to this type of coalitions,
v(n + et)   v(n)  x1
t  v(n)   v(n   et); (4)
whenever v(n + et) and v(n   et) are well-deﬁned.10
Next, we introduce the notion of a separating limit market equilibrium (SLME) that allows us
to derive explicit LME payoffs as a function of market fundamentals.
Deﬁnition 2. A LME x1 is separating if,
8S;S0  N : S \ S0 6= ?;T(S) 6= T(S0); v(S)x1(S0) 6= v(S0)x1(S):
In a SLME, the ratio of the coalitional values to the coalitional LME payoff (when the latter is
greater than zero) is different for any two intersecting coalitions of different types. Although only
such limit equilibria will arise in many games, e.g., the standard buyer and two identical sellers
case discussed in Example 1, one can easily construct examples, where the unique LME is not
separating. For instance, in the intermediation game, discussed last in Example 1, the members of
the buyer-seller coalition S = f1;2g obtain the joint limit payoff of one, which is the same as the
10The unit vector et belongs to the canonical basis of the Euclidean space and points in direction t.
12joint limit payoff of the members of coalition S0 = f1;2;3g. As v(S) = v(S0) = 1, this LME is
not separating.
The next theorem characterizes separating limit market equilibria.
Theorem 3. Let x1 be a SLME, then,
(i) all players of the same type cooperate in MCs of homogeneous types. The SLME induces,
therefore, a partition of player types according to the coalition type they cooperate in;








5. Dynamic Labor Market
A natural application of our framework is a labor market where workers (with various skills)
bargain over a remuneration scheme, taking into account ﬁrm’s value and their own (endogenous)
outside options. This allows us to compare the theoretical predictions of our model to those de-
rived in the neoclassical competitive setting and by the search theoretic literature. We start off by
discussing a labor market with homogeneous workers for which we derive the equilibrium wage
and the ﬁrm size. Subsequently, we generalize our results to a heterogeneous input market.
5.1. Homogeneous Labor Market
At each date, the labor market consists of one entrepreneur, i, and N homogenous workers
where a generic worker is indexed by w. We will denote the set of workers by Nw, hence, the set
of all players N = Nw [ fig. Each worker has the same bargaining power denoted by w. The
productivity of a coalition with n  N workers and the entrepreneur (a productive coalition) is
given by the production function F(n) : N 7! R+, i.e., v(S) = F(n) for all S  N such that
i 2 S and jS \ Nwj = n. In particular, production is impossible without workers, F(0) = 0, or
without the entrepreneur, v(S) = 0 for all S  Nw.
13We can compute the ME payoffs for the entrepreneur and a representative worker, x
i and x
w,
respectively, from (1) when only coalitions with n workers are matched. For symmetric matching
probabilities, system (1) is reduced to two equations,
xi = xi +
i
(n)
max(F(n)   xi   nxw;0); (6)









max(F(n)   xi   nxw;0);
where (n) := i + nw. It can be shown that the solution (x
i;x









Notably, expression (7) does not depend on the discount factor . Instead, it depends in an intuitive
way on the relative bargaining power between the entrepreneur and the worker and it is an decreas-
ing function of the relative labor market tightness, n=N where n is the number of vacancies in the
market and N measures total labor supply. In particular, when the market is tight (n=N is low) the
entrepreneur extracts a higher share of the value of the ﬁrm and the opposite holds, when there is
relatively more vacancies (relatively larger ﬁrm size) than the number of workers looking for a job.
From the solution (x
i;x


















which do not depend on the matching probabilities and are a special case of the limit payoffs
speciﬁed in item (ii) of Theorem 3. Moreover,
@x1
w=@N < 0; @x1
i=@N > 0:
The above derivatives are similar to the ﬁndings in search models, e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984):
the tighter the labor market (i.e. the higher the labor supply N for a given number of vacancies
14n) the lower the worker’s wage (x1
w) is. The reverse is expected to hold with respect to the en-
trepreneur’s payoff.
So far, our assumption that only coalitions with n workers are matched led to the equilibrium
payoffs (8). In general, however, all productive coalitions may have a (random) opportunity to
cooperate. If we focus on a SLME, a unique ﬁrm size and unique limit payoffs (8) emerge endoge-
nously. Recall that the separating property rules out a speciﬁc relationship between equilibrium
payoffs and coalitional productiveness. Then, item (i) of Theorem 3 implies that only coalitions of
a speciﬁc size, say with n workers, will be active in a SLME x1 and that each player type will earn
the limit payoff 5. Furthermore, we can re-write item (iii) of Theorem 2 as
F(n)   F(n   1)  x1
w  F(n + 1)   F(n): (9)
Essentially, the above expressions establishes the parity between the separating limit payoff and
the neoclassical wage. It entails that the outcome of our multilateral bargaining procedure results
in each worker being paid approximately her marginal contribution to the ﬁrm value. Given the as-
sumption of homogenous labor, we can interpret the marginal contribution as the marginal product
of labor.
To facilitate our discussion of how the equilibrium ﬁrm size is related to the market funda-
mentals, i.e., technology and input abundance, we will assume that the ﬁrm is endowed with a
Cobb-Douglas production function, F(n) = An, and that the labor input in this function is a
continuous variable. In order to simplify the expressions, we focus on a symmetric situation, in
which the bargaining power of the entrepreneur is the same as the collective bargaining power of










Recall that (9) indicates that the wage should approximate the product of the marginal worker
11Without this assumption, we can establish qualitatively the same results but we will have to deal with more compli-
cated expressions that depend on bargaining powers.















Notably, we obtain a full characterization of the SLME - the unique ﬁrm size, wages, and proﬁt -
without any reference to an exogenous reservation wage (the outside option of the worker). No-
tice that the equilibrium ﬁrm size is larger the greater the total labor supply N. Furthermore, an
increase in  - i.e., a more productive technology - leads to a larger equilibrium ﬁrm size n, lower











 (1   )
1  ;
as the expression on the r.h.s. of the last equality increases in  when n = N=(1   ) > 1.
So far in our framework, we have discussed labor market equilibria in the absence of frictions,
i.e.  ! 1. In markets with frictions, we can further replicate the stylized fact that players of the
same type may obtain a different expected payoff. This is driven by the matching environment
and the fact that players of the same type may reach an agreement in coalitions of distinct types in
equilibrium.13
5.2. Labor Market with Heterogeneous Inputs
This section generalizes the results derived for homogeneous labor markets. At each date, the
labor market consists of Nt workers of type t = 1;:::;T and one entrepreneur i (player type
T +1). The production function takes now the form F(n1;:::;nT) : NT 7! R+, where nt refers to
the number of t-type workers employed by the ﬁrm. Alternatively, we can interpret F as the output
12Clearly,  > 1=2 implies n > N. In this case, it can be shown that n = N in the SLME.
13As an illustration, consider the following example. Let the set of workers be Nw = 1;2 and the entrepreneur i.
Let the coalition surplus be v(fi;1;2g) = 2, v(fi;1g) = v(i;2) = 1, and v(S) = 0 for any other S  fi;2;3g.
Let fi;1;2g = 1=5, fi;1g = 3=5, and fi;2g = 1=5; and  = 0:9. Then all productive coalitions agree in ME and
xi = 0:5693, x1 = 0:5052 and x2 = 0:4705.
16of a hierarchy with T levels and nt employees at each level t. In the unique SLME, only coalitions
composed of the entrepreneur and a particular proﬁle n = (n1;:::;nT) of workers are active and
players of the same type earn the limit payoffs (5) that exhaust the product. Furthermore, part (ii)
of Theorem 2 takes the form,
F(n)   F(n   et)  x1
t  F(n + et)   F(n); for all t = 1;:::;T;
which generalizes our ﬁndings about the relationship between the SLME payoffs and the neoclassi-
cal wage. The inequalities imply that for each type, a worker of that type receives (approximately)
her marginal contribution to the ﬁrm value. In addition, the SLME payoffs deﬁned in (5) imply








; s;t = 1;:::;T: (12)
The latter relationship reveals that the relative scarcity of each type in the market inﬂuences the
relative wages in the expected way: a higher supply Nt of type t workers depresses their relative
individual wages ceteris paribus. On the other hand, the total number nt of workers of type t, em-
ployed in an equilibrium ﬁrm, has a positive impact on their relative wages. This is not surprising,
when we observe that nt represents the demand for this type by the equilibrium ﬁrm. Therefore,
(12) combines in a clear-cut manner the supply and demand forces in the market, adjusted by the
type-speciﬁc bargaining power.
Next, we consider a Cobb-Douglas production function with T worker types and treat each





T ; with n = (n1;:::;nT); t > 0;
XT
t=1t < 1:
It will turn out convenient to treat the entrepreneur as a player of type T + 1,
NT+1 = nT+1 = 1; T+1 := 1  
PT
t=1t:
For the sake of simplicity, we assume again equal bargaining power for each group in the equilib-
rium ﬁrm,
nss = ntt; for all t;s = 1;:::;T + 1: (13)
17Similar to our analysis of the equilibrium ﬁrm size in the homogeneous labor market, we can
derive the unique equilibrium ﬁrm composition n by approximating the limit SLME payoff x1
t by








F(n) for all t = 1;:::;T: (14)










Using (14), the limit payoffs (5), and the equal bargaining power assumption, (13), we can derive









s=1 (sNs)s; for t = 1;:::;T + 1:
Here we assume an interior solution 1 < nt < Nt (or, equivalently, t < T+1) for each type
t = 1;:::;T. InaninteriorSLME,anincreaseinproductivityoftypesleadstohigheremployment











> 0 for all t;s = 1;:::;T:
On the other hand, increasing the supply of type s decreases the payoff of this type, while it in-















> 0; t;s = 1;:::;T;t 6= s:
Notice that in the SLMEa discussed above not all coalitions which are matched reach an agree-
ment. Thus some workers choose to remain unemployed in anticipation of higher wages and some
ﬁrms choose to keep vacancies unﬁlled in the anticipation of higher proﬁts. This insight complies
with the stylized facts found in the search-theoretic literature, cf. Rogerson et al. (2005). We de-
rive these results, however, in an environment where market frictions, as captured by the matching
probabilities, do not matter for the equilibrium behavior. Moreover, in our framework positive
equilibrium level of unemployment co-exists with the neoclassical competitive equilibrium rule
that is rewarding all inputs their marginal product.
186. Concluding remarks and extensions
We have developed a price-setting mechanism that makes explicit the role of strategic behavior
in the context of dynamic multilateral markets. We have shown the existence and payoff unique-
ness of SSPE in any multilateral market game in which players exhibit at least some degree of
impatience. Furthermore, we have studied in more detail the implications of our theoretical frame-
work for the equilibrium price in the labor market. Unlike, other price-setting mechanisms based
on multilateral bargaining applied to the labor market, we ﬁnd that our procedure results in equi-
librium prices which equal the respective marginal product of the factors of production. In this
respect, we see our model as providing a strategy-based microeconomic alternative to the Wal-
rasian auctioneer’s procedure to ﬁnd the competitive prices. Moreover, our model allows for an
endogenous determination of the composition of a ﬁrm with heterogeneous inputs without any ref-
erence to the outside options of players. In this setting, we ﬁnd support for a number of stylized
facts discussed in the search-theoretic models, such as the existence of voluntary unemployment
and unﬁlled vacancies, the dependence of wages on the relative scarcity of skill type, and that
workers of homogeneous skill types may obtain different equilibrium payoffs.
Further extensions to the current study of the labor market are possible. Similar to Stole and
Zwiebel (1996a) one can address the question of organization design in the context of multilat-
eral coalitions and investigate how the interplay of factors’ productivity, factors’ abundance, and
bargaining power shape up the equilibrium outcome. In such setting the hierarchical depth and
width of the ﬁrm may be derived endogenously in market equilibrium as a function of the market
fundamentals.
We also want to stress the straightforward applicability of our results to markets that exhibit
multilateral structure of interactions, such as the housing market, credit-card market or retailing.
For example, an application of (5) to a market game with T types of players, where only coalitions
composed of one player of each type are productive, results in unique SLME payoffs.14 Similar










sNt for t;s = 1;:::;T:
19intuition to the analysis of two-sided markets can be derived here, too. A player’s payoff is increas-
ing with her bargaining power and with the relative weighted scarcity of players of her own type
with weights equal to the bargaining power of each type. Moreover, the equilibrium payoff of each
player is positively related to the number of players of the opposite type and negatively related the
number of players of her own type.
7. Appendix
PROOF. Theorem 1:
The proof boils down to showing that the mapping f : RN ! RN on the r.h.s. of (1),






Iv(S)x(S)(v(S)   x(S)); 8i 2 N; (15)
where Ic = 1 if c is true and Ic = 0 otherwise, is a contraction. We can write f at point x 2 RN
in matrix form,
f(x) = fx(x) := (I   Dx)x + bx; I;D;x 2 RNN
+ ;bx 2 RN
+;












S = S=(S)  0; 8i;j 2 N:
Hence, D is a diagonal matrix and x is a non-negative symmetric matrix (note that Dx is
not necessarily symmetric). We observe that the maximum eigenvalue of Dx is bounded from





















) max(Dx)  jjDxjj1  1:
20In order to show the lower bound, min(Dx)  0, we note ﬁrst that x is positive semideﬁnite,






















the same set of eigenvalues because
(D1=2
 xD1=2
 )z = z , (Dx)e z = e z; where e z := D1=2
 z:













 P)T. As the former diagonal matrix has only nonnegative entries (eigenvalues of x), the
same must hold for the latter. We showed, therefore, the bounds on the eigenvalues of Dx and,
incidentally, on the corresponding eigenvalues of I   Dx,
0  i(Dx)  1 )
0  i(I   Dx) = (1   i(Dx))  :
We conclude that fx is a contraction,
8x;v;y 2 RN; jjfx(v)   fx(y)jj  jjv   yjj:
Now, in order to show that f contracts v;y 2 RN, we choose on the segment (v;y)  RN a
sequence fv = z0;z1;:::;zn;zn+1 = yg of all points with increasing distances from v such that





k(). Note that this sequence is ﬁnite as (v;y) can cross only a ﬁnite number of
(intersections of) hyperplanes of the form v(S) = z(S). By construction, any point zk;k+1 2
21(zk;zk+1), k = 0;::;n, induces the same linear contraction fzk;k+1. Then, the continuity of f
implies that,
f(zk) = fzk;k+1(zk) = fzk 1;k(zk);
where only the ﬁrst (second) equality holds for k = 0 (k = n + 1). In particular, for the points
fz0;z1;z2g, we obtain,
jjf(z0)   f(z1)jj = jjfz0;1(z0)   fz0;1(z1)jj  jjz0   z1jj;
jjf(z1)   f(z2)jj = jjfz1;2(z1)   fz1;2(z2)jj  jjz1   z2j:
By the triangular property and the above inequalities,
jjf(z0)   f(z2)jj  jjf(z0)   f(z1)jj + jjf(z1)   f(z2)jj
 jjz0   z1jj + jjz1   z2jj = jjz0   z2jj;
wherethelastequalityfollowsbecausefz0;z1;z2glieonthesameline. Hence, f contractsfz0;z2g
and we can iterate this argument for fz0;z3g,..., fz0;zn+1g = fv;yg. 
PROOF. Theorem 2:
(i) First, we will show that all players of the same type receive the same payoff in a LME. Consider
a LME x1 and, for the sake of contradiction, let x1
i > x1
j for two distinct players i;j 2 N with
i 6= j who are of the same type, i.e., T(fig) = T(fjg). Then, for all S  N n fi;jg and some 












v(S [ fjg)   x(S [ fjg)

as T(fig) = T(fjg) implies that i = j and for all S  N n fi;jg, S[fig = S[fjg, (S [
fig) = (S [fjg), and v(S [fig) = v(S [fjg). The above inequality holds as an equality if and
only if S[fig = S[fjg = 0.






























= (1   )x
j:
This leads to a contradiction as by assumption x
i > x
j for  ! 1.
Thus, we can index by x1
t the LME payoff for all players of type t and all types t = 1;:::;T.





Recall that for any active coalition S  N in a ME x, it holds that v(S)   x  0. We
proceed by establishing a contradiction. Thus we assume that there exists a coalition S  N such

















Asthisleadstoacontradiction, itmustbethatforallactivecoalitionsS intheLMEx1, lim!1(v(S) 
x(S)) = 0. Thus, using the fact that all players of the same type receive equal limit payoffs, we




(iii) Consider a player of type t who cooperates in a LME x1 in a coalition S with T(S) = n.
Then, by (i), we can write
x1(S) = v(S) = v(n) =
PT
t=1ntx1
t; x1(S0)  v(S0); 8S0  N:
23The latter inequality must hold, in particular, for
S0 = S  : T(S ) = n   et & S0 = S
+
: T(S+) = n + et:








s + (nt + 1)xt = v(n) + xt  v(n + et) = v(S+);
which yields the claim. 
Before we discuss the proof of Theorem 3, we establish the following supplementary results.
Lemma 1. In a SLME x1,
8S;S0 : T(S) 6= T(S0);S \ S0 6= ?; x1(S) = v(S) ) x1(S0) > v(S0):
PROOF. First, notice that the case x1(S) = v(S) ) x1(S0) < v(S0) is ruled out by Theorem 2
item (i).
Next, consider the case x1(S) = v(S) ) x1(S0) = v(S0). Then one of the following three
cases must hold:






) x1(S)v(S0) = x1(S0)v(S);
v(S)  v(S0) = 0 ) x1(S)  x1(S0) = 0 ) x1(S)v(S0) = x1(S0)v(S) = 0;
v(S0)  v(S) = 0 ) x1(S0)  x1(S) = 0 ) x1(S)v(S0) = x1(S0)v(S) = 0:
As shown all of the above three cases contradict the separating property of x1, which completes
the proof. 
Lemma 2. If the ME x implies that all players of types t and s with s;t 2 f1;:::;Tg cooperate
only in coalitions of type n = (n1;:::;nT), then,
nssx(Nt) = nttx(Ns):
24PROOF. By summing up (1) over all t-type players for some t 2 f1;:::;Tg, one obtains the total
payoff of the players of this type,
















Note that we use the fact that the bargaining power t is the same for all players of type t.
By the same argument, the total payoff to the players of type s 2 f1;:::;Tg is x(Ns) =
nss(n)=(1   ) and the claim follows. 
PROOF. Theorem 3:
(i) To show that in all SLMEa, all players of the same type cooperate in MCs of homogeneous
types, we will proceed by establishing a contradiction. Consider a SLME x1. For the sake of con-
tradiction assume that in this SLME players i and j of type t 2 f1;:::;Tg cooperate in coalitions
S and S0, respectively, with T(S) = (n1;:::;nT) 6= (n0
1;:::;n0
T) = T(S0). Let the coalition S00
be the same as S0 except for player i who replaces player j, i.e. S00 = S0 [ fig n fjg. Hence,
T(S) 6= T(S0) = T(S00) and fig 2 S \ S00. As S and S0 are active, Theorem 2, items (i) and (ii),
and the fact that T(S0) = T(S00) imply,
v(S) = x1(S); x1(S0) = v(S0) = v(S00) = x1(S00):
However, this contradicts, by Lemma 1, the separating property of x1 as S \ S00 6= ? and T(S) 6=
T(S00).
(ii) Consider a SLME x1. We have established that each player of type t 2 f1;:::;Tg cooper-
ates in MCs of homogeneous types. By Lemma 2, the total payoff for all players of type t and all
players of type s 2 f1;:::;Tg, that cooperate in MCs of the same type as a type t  player, i.e.,
n = (n1;:::;nT), satisfy
nssx(Nt) = nttx(Ns):
25This equality must hold also for the SLME x1. Thus using Theorem 2 item (ii), we can re-write





t = 0 implies x1
s = 0 for any two distinct types that cooperate in a coalition S such
that T(S) = n. This is only possible in a SLME if v(S) = v(n) = 0.
Suppose x1
t > 0 for some type t. Then, by Theorem 2 items (i) and (ii), it follows that
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